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Abstract: 
 
This paper studies the cost of equity and capital of three Bulgarian listed banks in the 
framework of the Modigliani-Miller (MM) theory of capital structure. It measures the 
impact of an increase in capital ratios on the equity risk (equity beta) of these banks.  
 
It finds that, historically, while more equity results in lower banks’ systematic risk no causal 
relationship can be found between an increase in capital ratios and the predicted by the 
theory decrease in banks’ systematic risk. MM irrelevance argument holds that a decrease 
in equity risk will lead to a decrease in the shareholders’ required (and expected) return on 
equity and thus offsetting the higher equity (capital) level.  
 
Thus, the results cannot find evidence in support of the so-called “Modigliani-Miller” offset. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper will investigate the impact of an increase in equity capital (equity ratios) 
of three listed on the Bulgaria Stock Exchange-Sofia banks on their cost of equity 
and cost of capital. It will try to find evidence that capital structure does not affect 
the overall funding costs of these banks. Some recent literature and related 
empirical work suggest that the overall cost of capital will remain unchanged 
despite changes in the capital structure, and specifically following an increase in the 
equity ratio (regulatory or voluntary-driven). This body of work applies concepts 
from modern capital structure and asset pricing theory.  
 
The last financial and banking crises that started in 2007-2008 made academics and 
policy makers initiate a vast regulatory reform in banking with some measures 
targeting the capital structure. Regulators decided to put a floor under the built-up 
of leverage (Basel III process) and to introduce hard leverage ratio (the opposite of 
equity ratio) as a supplementary measure to the risk-based rules (Basel II rules). By 
requiring banks to use more equity funding, regulators aim to avoid their insolvency 
and make banks more stable. Unsurprisingly, bankers consider equity costlier than 
debt, so more of it will increase the weighted average cost of capital.  
 
In this debate one strand of academic thinking brings in the classical concept of the 
Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem (1958) which predicts that in a world of perfect 
and efficient markets and absence of taxes and friction costs, the average cost of 
capital (pre-tax WACC) is unaffected by the capital structure of the company, i.e. 
the overall funding costs are not affected by the structure of the various claimants 
on the company assets. Although equity may be more expensive compared to 
cheaper debt – as claimed by the bankers’ community, the higher average cost 
should be offset by the lower rates of return on both, equity and debt. 
 
If higher capital levels will increase overall funding costs is very much an empirical 
concern. This research attempts to address and test this hypothesis by using long-
term data for three listed Bulgarian banks. The main objective is to evaluate the 
MM offset of higher capital requirements on the cost of equity and overall capital of 
the three banks. Far from complete such an analysis will shed light on the Bulgarian 
banking sector contribution to the ongoing debate. The analysis is innovative in this 
respect as it is the first one to test the dependencies among the related factors; to 
what extent these factors explain the relation between the size of capital, the risk 
and return and the impact of regulation, as well as the behavior of market 
participants in evaluating the required return.  
 
The testing period starting from 2006 till end 2016 covers two sub-periods – the 
first one till 2010 marked by a dynamic stock exchange activity on BSE-Sofia, and 
the second one after 2010 affected by the introduction of the new post crises 
banking legislation (Basel 2.5 and Basel 3). 
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Another innovative aspect is also the testing of the applicability of widely used 
theoretical and empirical models such as CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) and 
WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) for the Bulgarian capital markets, and 
specifically for the local banks.  
 
Some research finds strong arguments in support of the MM prediction -- it is 
simply a myth and fallacy that equity capital is expensive as there is no strong 
positive link between banks holding more equity and having higher cost of funds. 
Admati et al. (2011) claim more equity and less debt should not be more expensive 
and thus will not affect banks’ cost of capital (equity plus debt). Miles (2012) finds 
that large increase in bank equity results in small long-run increase in the average 
cost of banking funding for major UK listed banks. Kashyap (2010) studies the 
impact of heightened capital requirements for big banks on the price of banking 
loans and finds no major impact. King (2010) finds only a modest increase in the 
credit spreads of banks stock prices in major EU countries; de Bandt et al. (2014) 
find evidence in support of MM offset for five major listed French banks. 
 
There is also evidence in support of the opposite strand -- a reduction in equity beta 
does not translate to a reduction in the cost of equity. Baker and Wurgler (2013) 
find a 10%-point increase in the required Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets ratio 
would have increased the overall cost of capital by as much as 90 basis points. 
 
The central point of this study is testing whether an increase of capital ratios will 
decrease the systematic risk of three listed Bulgarian banks thus providing evidence 
in favor of the MM theorem. The idea is that as bank equity increases (i.e. capital 
ratio increases) the risk of holding it falls. Rational investors will correctly price the 
new risk and will reduce the required rate of return. Subsequently, the average cost 
of capital of bank’s funding will stay unchanged as the higher equity in the WACC 
equation will be offset by the decrease in the expected return (cost) of equity 
capital.  
 
To test the MM offset the author keeps the stringent assumptions of the MM model. 
The tax regime and its shield effect will be excluded. Still, the three banks face real 
world factors - asymmetric information, market frictions, transaction costs, agency 
arguments and thus it is expected that MM offset may not exactly hold. 
 
A handful recent studies have argued that the banks overall cost of capital can be 
measured properly. Accepted regulatory and economic capital models return a 
number for the amount (and price) of capital banks must or may wish to hold. 
Applying MM capital structure theory to the financing decisions of banks has been 
proposed as the academic’s solution to calculate the required capital. Holding more 
equity capital became the modern paradigm in the 2007 after crises times as an 
alternative to regulatory risk-weighted capital calculations. Still some of these 
studies acknowledge banks are special entities and argue that the role of leverage, 
taxes and other factors are different in this highly regulated sector from non-
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financial firms (Thalassinos and Thalassinos, 2006; Thalassinos and Politis, 2011; 
Thalassinos et al., 2010; 2015; Thalassinos and Dafnos, 2015; Liapis et al., 2013; 
Keisidou et al., 2013; Hanias et al., 2007).  
 
Most of the models agree that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the 
correct approach to measure the required rate of return. It correctly measures the 
cost of equity capital and assesses bank riskiness. King (2010) points that the 
CAPM method is one most commonly used by practitioners to estimate a firm’s 
cost of equity pointing to surveys by Brunner et al. (1998) and Graham and Harvey 
(2001). King (2010) uses the CAPM to estimate the real cost of equity for 89 largest 
public banks located in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and 
the United States.  
 
However, still very little is known about the empirical relevance of the MM capital 
structure theory and most of the empirical work is based on banks in developed 
capital markets in Europe and the United States. Without testing the robustness of 
these findings outside the environment in which they were uncovered, it is hard to 
determine what these empirical facts will be in less developed capital markets. 
 
For example, much of the talk in the banking industry is concerned that higher 
capital ratios (CR) will imply significantly higher cost of loans for firms. Testing 
crudely this presumption for the Bulgarian banks gives little support (Figures 1 and 
Figure 2) for the years after the 2007 financial crises: 
 
Figure 1: Regulatory CR vs percentage spread b/n business loans rates and 3-month 
SOFIBOR rate 
 
Source: BNB data and the author own calculations 
 
There is little evidence that increase in the CR suppresses GDP growth. Figure 3 
gives an eight-year series: no clear relation is evident but an upward correlated trend 
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between the average growth of the economy and the capitalization of the banks over 
the last two years. 
 
Figure 2: Total lending volumes and regulatory capital ratios 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using BNB Financial Supervision reports on the banking 
system 
 
Figure 3: GDP growth vs. Regulatory capital ratio 
 
Source: Authors calculations using BNB data on banking system; Ministry of Finance 
 
2. Method and the empirical model 
 
The main objective of the analysis is to evaluate the change in capital ratios and the 
risk-return relationship for the banks in the stock market so to give evidence in the 
discussion of whether increased equity ratios will make the cost of capital higher. 
This method borrows from de Brandt et all (2014) methodology which estimates the 
relationship between banks’ cost of capital (WACC) and an increase in equity 
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(capital ratio) by using the CAPM and MM I proposition. The CAPM is used to 
estimate the new required return on equity (CoE) given a change in CR and a 
related change in the beta equity (β equity). 
Equation (1): 
 
 
Where  is the correlation between the bank i’s equity return (β equity) and the 
market return; Rf   is the risk-free rate of return and the term is the 
excess equity market return. 
 
What is referred to the MM argument is that the left hand-side of equation (2) below 
does not change when equity ratio (CR) increases. The method simulates this 
increase on the CoE which is then used in the WACC formula to estimate how 
banks’ total cost of capital changes or off-sets the increase in the level of capital. 
Equation 1: 
 
 
This methodology relies on the logical argument of the MM propositions. As bank 
capital increases investors will expect a decrease in bank’s stock price volatility and 
will require lower return based only on the systematic risk they cannot diversify. To 
measure empirically the link the analysis continues with regressing the change in 
beta on the change in CR. The baseline model is: 
Equation 3: 
 
 
Where: 
 
is the disturbance term; 
 
is a measure of change in beta 
 
is constant bank specific effect 
 
is a measure of change in CR with one period lag to avoid  
endogenity 
 
are the yearly time dummy-variables 
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3. Data, banks, price returns and betas 
 
The analysis employs a dataset which combines individual price returns for the 
three banks listed on the BSE-Sofia, their accounting capital ratios and the returns 
on the stock market SOFIX15 index (used as a proxy for the market portfolio in the 
CAPM formula) from Q1 2009 through Q3 2016. The primary source of the banks’ 
stock prices is the BSE-Sofia; other public information sources are used for 
macroeconomic indicators and banking industry data.  
 
The analysis starts with an estimation of the historical equity betas (β equity) using 
the daily stock market returns (prices) of each bank together with the returns for the 
SOFIX15 index. The banks in the analysis are FIB (First Investment Bank), BACB 
(Bulgarian American-Credit Bank) and CCB (Central Cooperative Bank). For each 
bank its β equity is calculated by regressing its daily stock returns on the daily 
SOFIX returns for every three-month period of the eight years’ time series. 
 
Figure 4: Average beta and accounting capital ratios (CR) for the three banks 
 
Source: BNB Financial Supervision reports; author’s own calculations 
 
4. Capital Ratios 
 
The analysis continues with computing the accounting capital ratios (CR) for each 
bank using the national central bank’s (Bulgarian National Bank) public dataset. 
The CR is equal to the sum of the annual balance sheet equity capital and reserves 
above the total assets of the bank. 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the two variables - beta and accounting 
CR. The average beta equals 0.93 meaning that banks’ equity is less volatile to 
market fluctuations. The average beta was not initially influenced by the 2007 crises 
but in the following years when its effects were felt in the local stock exchange 
market (Figure 4). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for beta and accounting capital ratios (CR)  
Variable N Mean Median SD 
Beta 33 0.93 0.92 0.02 
CR (%) 33 0.14 0.13 0.40 
Note: This table presents main descriptive statistics for the period 2009 - 2016. Beta is 
estimated using the SOFIX15 index as the market return. CR is computed as book 
equity over book total assets. Data frequency is quarterly. 
 
Figure 5: Average accounting capital ratio for the three banks 
 
Source: BNB Financial Supervision reports; author’s own calculations 
 
Accounting CR are traditionally very high – 13.6%. (compared to an average of 
4.11% for the French banks for the same period, de Brand et al, 2014). They start 
falling in the aftermath of the crises when more persistent and long-term effects hit 
the real economy, increased the stock of non-performing loans and wiped out the 
profits of the banks. 
 
Figure 4 for betas and Figure 5 for the average accounting CR exhibit a fluctuating 
trend which suggests the series might be non-stationary. The analysis does not 
include a unit root test to test for this but to cope with the issue, as proposed by de 
Brandt (2014), it works with the first-difference of the values between each 
subsequent time interval but not with the data on levels.  
 
To estimate the link between the CR and cost of capital the analysis matches the 
estimated β equity with accounting CRs. It employs accounting CR rather than 
regulatory capital ratios which are different and do not align with the MM 
framework balance sheet proportions. By regressing the change in the estimated 
equity betas for each bank on each bank capital ratio, the model assesses whether 
CR affects the risk of equity. It is expected the estimated association to be negative. 
Figure 6 gives the scatter plot of the values of change in equity β against change in 
banks’ CR (the correlation coefficient). 
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Figure 6: Scatter plot for the correlation coefficient 
 
 
Against expectations, the correlation coefficient is 0.065 with a positive sign and 
insignificantly small. It shows no association between change in betas and change in 
CR for the observed period. 
 
5. Results and analysis 
 
The model considers only the effect of capitalization of banks and no other 
restructuring, supervisory or management decisions are included. 
 
Table 2: First difference: Beta and accounting capital ratio 
Δ Beta equity 
Variables Regression OLS: 
ΔCR  0.0473 
Intercept (0.00001) 
Observations 32 
R Square 0.0078 
N. of banks 3 
Note: This table reports regression estimates of a change in equity beta on a change on 
accounting capital ratios. Beta is estimated on a quarterly frequency using the SOFIX15 
index for the market return. CR is computed as book equity over book total assets. 
Significance is at 5 percent. 
 
The model gives estimates for the OLS of the unknown parameters reported in table 
2. As pointed above the results are not in line with the predictions of the theory and 
they are not in support of the theory as the findings of the French (de Brandt et al, 
2014) and UK banks (Miles, 2012). The estimate is positive but statistically 
insignificant (the R square is only 0.023) and thus not meaningful. The estimated 
model has a poor fit and does not explain whether the amount of capital held by 
banks has an impact on the riskiness of their equity. One possible explanation can 
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be that the model estimates suggest market participants do not consider the change 
in CR to assess the riskiness of a bank equity capital. 
 
6. Predictions: capital ratios and cost of equity 
 
In efficient markets with no frictions and transaction costs an increase in capital 
ratios will be associated with lower equity betas and lower returns on equity capital. 
The results of this analysis cannot be related to the predictions of the MM theorem. 
While the estimates look illogical there may be other endogenous facts and 
academic literature that explain these but not covered by the author. 
 
A possible explanation may be found in Baker and Wurgler (2013) who point that 
cross-sectional relationship between capital structure and betas cannot be used to 
measure the causality effect of an increase in capital. Too, de Brand et al find no 
evidence that regulatory CR influences riskiness. The reason is a possible non-
normality of the distribution of the variables which might be solved by a log-
specification of the model. 
 
The results of this study require further investigation and application of more 
rigorous econometric techniques and tests. A more sophisticated model for 
examples can model changes in bank CoC as a function of changes and levels of 
balance sheet and macro financial variables as suggested by an IMF paper (2014). 
 
6.1 Model simulation of the MM offset 
The results from the first stage of the empirical analysis do not support the 
theoretical argument of the MM theorem, specifically that changes in the capital 
structure must result in changes to the return on equity (and the return on debt) that 
ensure that return on assets is unchanged. It is why a simulation of such an offset 
effect is pointless. It cannot estimate the magnitude of a fall in the related CoE and 
CoC (WACC). If the result was affirmative, based on the CAPM calculation it 
would have implied that the expected return on equity falls when the capital 
increase. The next step would have been to calculate the return on equity from 
historical betas as follows:  
 
Equation 5: 
 
 
So that expected return on equity equals 2.8%+0.79*9.2%=10.07%, where the 
risk-free rate equals the average 10-year local government bonds yields, the beta 
equity is the estimated average historical beta for the four banks and the equity risk 
premium is the rate given by Damodaran (2015). The WACC is calculated by 
using equation (2): WACC = 13.7% *10.07% + 86.4%*2.8%, where the CR is the 
estimated sample mean for the three banks and the debt is assumed to be risk-free. 
Next, from the baseline model: 
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a new return on equity would have been calculated, given an increase in CR, where 
𝛾  ̂ is the estimated coefficient in the first-difference regression of change in beta 
equity on change in CR. Recalculating WACC with the new RoE and a hypothetical 
doubling of the CR, for example, and comparing to the WACC calculated when no 
increase in CR occurred would have given a stylized quantification of the MM 
offset. 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This analysis’s main ideas are: firstly, and most importantly to test the MM capital 
structure irrelevance proposition for three listed Bulgarian banks. While other 
empirical and theoretical papers give such evidence, the expected qualification 
stated in the beginning could not be repeated. 
 
Regulators are concerned with the stability of banks but also with the impact 
regulation has on banks’ costs of funds. Following the unexpectedly severe effect 
the recent financial crises caused on the run on banks (Acharya, 2009), academics 
look for a new paradigm to regulate banks. A few suggest looking to the classical 
capital structure theory to find the optimal debt-equity ratio that will ensure banks 
are resilient to panics. 
 
In a market with no taxes and imperfections MM theory (1958) predicts that holding 
more equity will not increase the cost of capital as its beta and risk will fall leaving 
the pretax WACC unchanged. As leverage decreases and firms become less risky 
investors and shareholders will correctly price their holdings and will require less 
return. To what extent there is an offset on banks WACC from the effect of using 
more equity? Though it is logical it is not self-evident and should be simulated and 
computed using real bank data. 
 
This analysis finds that data on capital ratios as proxy for equity and equity beta do 
not match the theory in the case of the selected three Bulgarian bank firms. The 
increase in equity does not affect its beta and the estimates of the regression 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. One possible interpretation might be that 
reducing equity beta will not reduce the cost of equity. Another one might be that 
the high capitalization of the Bulgarian banks (compared to an average CR of 4.5% 
for French banks over the same period) does not correlate with its systematic risk. 
Such a correlation and causal effect might exist at much lower levels of CR which 
for obvious reasons cannot be tested in this study. 
 
Other explanations that relate to the specificities of the Bulgarian stock market can 
be borrowed from a study of Donchev (2016) on the application of asset pricing 
models for stocks traded on the Bulgarian stock market. Donchev finds that pricing 
of expected returns on stocks by using CAPM is acceptable with certain limitations 
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– the model is dependent on the market capitalization of the company, the overall 
stock market liquidity (which in the case of the BSE-Sofia is low compared to 
mature markets) as well as the overall level of economic development of Bulgaria.  
 
The behavior of the stock market participants who do not respond by pricing 
efficiently the change in the levels of CR of banks may influence this “stickiness” 
of beta in a relationship that might not be linear. Other imperfections in the markets 
like regulatory capture, the political clientele and the incentives of bankers are 
variables which are present in real life though are distant deviation from the MM 
theory assumptions. 
 
The causal link between leverage and beta is not assured as it could also run in the 
opposite direction. For instance, a bank manager may first set a target risk profile 
and then decide on the leverage that is consistent with the target. More generally 
banks with different risk profiles (i.e. riskier loan books) may choose endogenously 
different capital structures by applying economic capital concept to model it.  
 
Furthermore, the choice of control variables attempts to capture other factors that 
can affect banks’ risk which are specific to each bank: return on assets (to account 
for overall bank profitability), total assets (to account for size) and risk-weighted 
assets (to control for a regulatory measure of balance sheet risk). Additional 
limitations of the leverage ratio are that it is a crude calculation as it does not 
distinguish different assets by their riskiness and this way may punish banks which 
hold highly liquid, high-quality assets. The bank asset risk is also borne by the debt 
holders and such a “risk-sharing” among equity and debt flattens the empirical 
relationship between capital ratios and beta. 
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